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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background and Problem Statement
'"While it is often said that it is wrong to begin new wars by re-fighting old ones, it is

the practice of the military and the media to do so, ” (Katz, 377).
War reporting has been the source of great controversy between the military and the
media throughout American history (Gersh, 7). A major area in which the media and

military often clash involves the issue of operational security. The clash is based on the
premise that, during wartime, a clever enemy can analyze a mass of unclassified,
seemingly innocuous information, both from press and military sources, and make an

accurate assessment of U.S. capabilities and intentions, including attack plans (Aukofer
and Lawrence, 23). Therefore, the military seeks to control distribution of such
information to prevent compromise of its secrets and strategies to the enemy.

The clash arises as the military seeks to control information for operational security
purposes and the press attempts to gather and accurately report news from the battlefield in

a timely manner. The press wants to tell the story and the military wants to win the war

and keep casualties to a minimum. The press wants freedom and the military wants control
(Aukofer and Lawrence, vii).

“The military and the media never understand each other very clearly,” according to
Steven L. Katz, counsel, Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate. Katz quoted

one veteran war correspondent as saying, “The military makes it difficult because it wants

it to be difficult.” Katz says the military-media tension is caused by differing priorities,
strong feelings, cultural differences, and confusion on both sides. Although each
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staunchly maintains that it defends and preserves democracy, they are often at odds with
each other (Katz, 377). The clash may be related to the views that each have of its

mission.
Military Views

To protect and defend the United States against its enemies, both foreign and domestic,

the military must be able to maintain secrets and deny vital knowledge to the enemies about
its plans and operations. For this reason the military seeks to control the distribution of

information that could compromise operational security.
In his article, “Press Responsibilities and Lessons from the Gulf,” Marty Linsky, a

teacher at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, said it is the job of the

military to see that its press relations are in sync with the war efforts: suppressing anything
that would risk national security or might give away vital information to the enemy;

stimulating public confidence and support in the war effort; and limiting information which
might shake public confidence, strain public patience, or restrict military options (Linsky,

6).

Military personnel live and work in environments where they must constantly practice
operational security measures both in peacetime and during war. Not only must they be

careful not to reveal classified material to personnel outside the military, they must also

know who in their unit is and is not authorized to have access to the material based on their

rank and security classification level. Troops are trained to be very careful in their
treatment of information and as a regular practice, to withhold material from unauthorized
personnel (Aukofer and Lawrence, 24).
In an article by staff writer William Matthews, in Army Times, the media are listed as a
possible danger to U.S. troops in Bosnia along with mines, snipers, cold and wet days,
dangerous roads, Serbs and Muslims (Matthews, 9). Williams said like the land mines,

the media are likely to turn up anywhere in Bosnia.
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To fend off possible disasters, Williams said the Army’s 5th Corps has given soldiers

headed to Bosnia a handy “Media Reference Card.” It has 13 recommendations on how to
deal with the media and five answers that can be used in response to practically any

question.
Advice the Army offers troops includes:
•

Don’t make off-the-record statements to reporters.

•

Don’t allow yourself to be badgered by the media. If necessary, politely end the
interview and contact your commander or the public affairs officer (PAO).

•

If a reporter comes to your unit and is not escorted by a public affairs officer or other
escort, refer the reporter to the Joint Information Bureau (JIB).

Never lie to the media.

Having said that, the Army also suggests a number of answers soldiers can feel safe
giving inquisitive reporters which include:

•

We are trained, ready and fully prepared to conduct peace enforcement operations.

•

We are a disciplined and trained force. We understand our mission and the rules of

engagement.
•

U.S. forces are confident in our trained and competent leaders. We have pride in our

leadership, from the president on down, and full trust in their decisions.

The struggle between the right to know and national security is unrelenting and
complex. In the Persian Gulf War, the latest chapter in American war history, news of the
war was filtered, delayed, and pooled, all in the interest of national security. Plagued with

the “sensitivities that govern access decisions,” the military stands accused of acting as

news assignment editors for the nation (Gersh, 7).
In a response to the question “Is media coverage forcing us to alter our approach to
operations other than war?” General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said, “The answer is a near-certain yes when it comes to peace-making operations, a
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more hesitant yes in the case of more benign peace-keeping operations, and probably a no
in the humanitarian operations, unless we talk of places like Bosnia, where all three are
intertwined.” He said the answer is yes in peace-making operations because the “security

and safety of the troops are at stake.” Shalikashvili said he thinks the age of instant, global
communications has forced the United States military to consider the media’s presence and
impact during its operations other than during a time of war (Hernandez, 14).

Media Views
Journalists believe that the First Amendment guarantee of a free and unfettered press is

absolutely essential to American democracy, and applies to the nation’s military operations

as it does to the actions of every other government institution (Aukofer and Lawrence,
vii). Journalists perform the important function of gathering newsworthy information and

presenting it to the public in a highly accurate and timely manner. In fact, the framers of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights intended the press to be a watchdog for government
affairs as well as to provide a free and open forum for citizens to express their opinions

(Aukofer and Lawrence, vii).
Also, in his article “Press Responsibilities and Lessons from the Gulf,” Linsky made
these points concerning what the press can learn from its coverage of the Gulf War.
•

The mainstream establishment should not make agreements with the government that

bind the entire press corps to a set of rules that may serve the interest of some better
than others.

•

The press must second guess the military on what is vital and what is not. It is the

function of the press to test limits set by the government, to challenge them and, if

necessary, to breach them. One of the cold realities of the Gulf War was that none of
the mainstream news organizations was willing to confront the government in courts

of law or public opinion when it might have made a difference (Linsky, 8).
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In a commentary in U,S. News & World Report, Joseph Galloway said, concerning
the military’s security reviews of journalists’ stories during the Gulf War, that the truth

was wounded by an information directorate bent on controlling the words and images that
flow from the battlefields” and “clogged a vital artery leading to America’s brain.”

Concerning the Pentagon’s handling of the press during the Gulf War, Steven
Manning of Scholastic Update said, “Politics and propaganda became criteria in news

coverage of the U.S. at war. Reporters acknowledge that restrictions are necessary in
wartime, but alleged the Pentagon went beyond legitimate security concerns and attempted

to present the American public a sanitized version of war,” (Manning, 22). Manning said
Americans have a right to know if they are being told the truth (Manning, 23).

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to survey the commanders and public affairs officers
who were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia in 1995 with the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored
Division as part of Operation Joint Endeavor, for their views about how they think the
media affected their units’ operational security. Many articles have been written concerning

the adversarial relationship between the military and the media, but little scientific research
has been published on the effects of the media on military operational security during times
of conflict. This study will build on the research previously conducted by Capt. John B.

Snyder and Capt. Kenneth D. Payne, as part of a survey and analysis of Military Public
Affairs Officers who served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They found that six
of ten public affairs officers were aware of reports published by the media that may have
compromised military operations. Such reports can add to the fears and myths of

commanders that media personnel cannot be trusted and if given the opportunity will
sacrifice the lives of Americans troops to publish a “hot” story (Snyder and Payne, 42).
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Significance

The military’s concern for operational security is one of the primary reasons why it
seeks to control reports by media personnel from the battlefield during times of conflict
and war. This has been a source of tension between the media and military throughout
history (Aukofer and Lawrence, vii).

However, the military and media are refining their understanding of each other and

experimenting with ways to accommodate each other while accomplishing their missions.
Recently, a year-long study, on the relationship between the military and the media, was
completed by Frank A. Aukofer, Washington bureau chief of the Milwaukee Journal

Sentinel, and William P. Lawrence, vice admiral of the United States Navy, Retired.
Aukofer and Lawrence released a book, “America’s Team: The Odd Couple,” which lists

12 recommendations for media and military personnel to improve their relationship
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995). The Center for Military History (CMH) in Washington
D.C. has completed a detailed study on the relationship between the military and media

from 1962 to 1973. The study has been published in two volumes, from 1962 to 1968 and
from 1968 to 1973, respectively.

To improve its relationship with journalists, the Pentagon is developing a new doctrine
on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate reporters
on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools, and field

combat exercises now include training on how to work with journalists (Gersh, 17). For
example, the United States Army sends selected public affairs officers to civilian
universities to obtain a masters’ degree in journalism and mass communications in an

effort to improve its relationship with the media.

This study is unique in that it will provide some immediate feedback to Army officials
concerning the effects the media are having on operational security (information about the
unit’s personnel, equipment and/or plans that if obtained by the enemy could adversely

affect the mission) in Bosnia. It can also be used by the Army as a source of information
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to help with the ongoing efforts to improve its relationship with the media. The research
questions for this study are listed below.

Research Questions
1. How do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia
think media coverage affected their unit’s operational security during Operation Joint
Endeavor?

2. Do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia think
they can trust news media personnel?

Hypotheses
The hypotheses below were developed in part from findings of Snyder and Payne’s

survey of military public affairs officers who served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm and from other literature (see Chapter II) concerning the relationship between the

military and media.

Their study focused on the performance of military public affairs officers in four areas,
one of which was operational security. Snyder and Payne indicated that operational

security results were perhaps “the most important, and disturbing,” of their findings.
They reported that six of ten public affairs officers stated they were aware of reports by the

media that may have compromised military operations. One in four officers knew of
information released by other military public affairs officers that may have compromised

military operations.
Hypotheses for this study will focus only on respondents’ knowledge of reports by the

news media that may have compromised operational security and their trust of news media

personnel. Also, respondents for this study will be commanders and public affairs
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officers, rather than just public affairs officers, as were surveyed in Snyder and Payne’s

study.

Hl-3

Knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have compromised

military operations decreases as rank increases during:
(1) mobilization phase
(2) deployment phase
(3) mission phase1.

These are suggested in part by the findings from the study conducted by Snyder and
Payne, which showed that personal knowledge of information released by military public

affairs personnel that may have compromised military operations, correlated negatively at
a statistically significant level, with rank, months of public affairs experience and military

public affairs schooling. Also, rank was chosen as a variable in hypotheses 1-3 because of

the significance placed upon it in the military.
Rank separates members of the military by levels of responsibility and consequently by

social, financial, and educational status. For example, officers of higher rank usually are
afforded more privileges to receive information. For example, most field grade officers
(majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels) receive education at military schools on a higher

level than most company grade officers (lieutenants and captains). Also, their duty
positions often allow them access to more information than most company grade officers.
This access coupled with the several years of experience that field grade officers have over

company grade officers will allow them to be more informed about media operations.

Capt. Janelie B. Roberts, in a study of soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division,
found that “as rank increased, the use of television, radio and newspaper to get immediate

1 The mobilization phase is the period of time from which the unit was officially notified of its mission
to departure of its first troops to Bosnia. The deployment phase is the period of time from which the first
soldiers departed the 1st Armored Division enroute to Bosnia until the official assumption of mission in
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knowledge on big news events increased. Conversely, as rank decreased, the use of
television, radio, newspapers and magazines, ‘for being my friend when I am alone and to
find interesting or unusual stories that I can tell others’ increased.” Roberts explained these

differences by age, education level, time in service and maturation. She found that the

“lower ranking soldiers were younger, their education level was lower and their time in

service was less. On the other hand, the higher ranking soldiers used media resources to
stay informed about big news events. This reflects a more mature soldier with a higher
education level and the need to understand the bigger picture,” (Roberts, 68).

H4-6 Commanders and public affairs officers’ trust2 of news media personnel increases
as rank increases during:
(1) mobilization phase

(2) deployment phase

(3) mission phase.
Also, these hypotheses were developed, in part, due to the findings of Snyder and

Payne’s study. They found a significant correlation between rank and news media
coverage. “The higher the rank, the more positive their attitudes were that the news media

provided fair and accurate reporting during Desert Storm. Senior ranking officers also

were of the opinion the news media provided excellent coverage during the Gulf War,”
(Snyder and Payne, 27).
Additionally, because of the increase in knowledge and experience that field grade

officers may have over company grade officers, it is presumed that they will have a better
understanding of the news media and recognize the need to build a positive relationship

that will help meet the needs of both the media and the military.

Bosnia. The mission phase is the period of time from which the 1st Armored Division officially assumed
the mission until they were officially relieved.
2 Trust is measured in terms of correct and impartial reports published by the news media.

10

Data-Gathering Procedures
The proposed methodology used for collecting the data was a mail survey with a
verbal frequency scale and a Likert scale for responses. The goal was to survey only
commanders and public affairs officers who were mobilized, deployed, and participated in

Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia.

Theory
The knowledge gap hypothesis is used to develop the theoretical framework for this
research. It states that those with higher socio-economic status (SES) would acquire

information from the mass media at a higher rate than those with lower SES (Fredin,
Monnett, and Kosicki, 176). In 1970 when Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien introduced the

hypothesis, it predicted that increased media publicity will exacerbate knowledge
differentials between the “haves” and the “have-nots” over time (Gaziano, 3). The

hypothesis stated:
As the infusion of mass media information into a social system
increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status
(SES) tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status
segments, so that the gap in knowledge between these segments tends to
increase rather than decrease (Gaziano, 4).
Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien emphasized their hypothesis concerned growth of
differential knowledge, stressing that “have nots” do gain knowledge but “haves” acquire

it at a greater rate. The relative gap between them grows, as a result. They presumed 1)
growth of human knowledge is irreversible under the period of time they studied and 2)

points of diminishing returns, or ceiling effects, either had not been reached or else
occurred at varying rates for different SES groups during the periods (Gaziano, 4).
Cecilie Gaziano, in her paper “A Twenty-Five-Year Review of Knowledge Gap

Research,” credited the Tichenor-Donohue-Olien team and ensuing critiques and
controversy with spurring the rapid development of knowledge gap investigations.

11
Gaziano estimated that there were about 92 studies conducted since Tichenor, Donohue,
and Olien’s research in 1970.

This study will use the knowledge gap hypothesis as a basis to explain the differential
in opinions between lower ranking officers and higher ranking officers in regard to the

effect of the media on operational security of units in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia.

The rationale is that most higher ranking officers (field grade officers), are provided with a
higher level of military schooling such as the Commanding Generals Staff College, which

is open to selected majors and the Army War College, which is available to selected
lieutenant colonels and colonels. In general, higher ranking officers usually receive more

pay and privileges than lower ranking officers, including easier access to media
information (Compart, 18).
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Security of operations is one of the greatest concerns of the military when working

with the media. A military commander’s major concern is that an enemy will know of his
attack plan in advance. A soldier’s greatest fear is that his unit will be ambushed (Aukofer

and Lawrence, 24). The remainder of this chapter looks at studies which relate
operational security issues to the relationship between the military and the media. These
studies are the military and the media, from 1968 to 1973; a survey and analysis of

Military Public Affairs Officers who served in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm;

America’s Team: The Odd Couple, a study on the relationship between the military and the

media; “Conflict and public opinion,” a research report on the media’s involvement in
covering the Persian Gulf War; “Censorship and television news coverage of the Persian

Gulf War,” a research report on the relationship between censorship and the emotional and

critical tone of television news during the Gulf War; several studies that show the
significance of the news media to soldiers. Finally, a summary will follow the literature
review.

The relationship between the military and the media
The Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, D.C., has completed a detailed

study and publication of the relationship between the military and media from 1962 to

1973. The study is significant in that it provides the military and the media the opportunity
to review and analyze operational security measures during the Vietnam war.
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A survey about operational security during the Gulf War
A survey and analysis of Military Public Affairs Officers who served in Operation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm was conducted by Capt. John B. Snyder and Capt.
Kenneth D. Payne, of the United States Army, as part of a research project at Marshall

University, in July 1992. The results of their study showed that six of every ten public

affairs officers who participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm said they
were aware of reports published by the media that may have compromised military
operations. One in four officers knew of information released by other military public

affairs officers that may have compromised military operations (Snyder and Payne, 42).

PA Os stated that unit locations, further operations, operational readiness of
units/equipment, and identification of local towns was the information most often
improperly released. PA Os, news media, and other military officers (e.g., operations
officers and commanders) shared in the release of this information that may have

compromised military operations (Snyder and Payne, 43).

One respondent reported that an entire unit battle plan was briefed to pool members by

the unit PAO, operations officer, and commander three weeks prior to the assault into
Iraq. Fortunately, according to the officer, the information was never released by the

media (Snyder and Payne, 43).

PA Os believe that if ground rules are established early and everyone follows those
rules, then operational security will improve. The issue of security at the source was raised

often. But one Army officer said, “Don’t say anything you don’t want to read in the

newspapers or see on television,” (Snyder and Payne, 43).
Another recommendation by PA Os related to the basic concept of training. Both the

media and PA Os require operational security training. There was too much confusion

regarding what was considered sensitive information by both sides (Snyder and Payne,

43).

I
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Snyder and Payne said that fear of release of sensitive operational information may

explain why some commanders and senior officers are reluctant to have the news media or

even public affairs officers within their area of operations (Snyder and Payne, 42). They
also said the knowledge of possible security compromises by reporters and PA Os may

explain why public affairs officers generally still do not trust the media. It may also
explain why the public affairs officers are not overwhelmingly favorable about the

experience level of fellow public affairs officers (Snyder and Payne, 43).

America’s Team: The odd couple
In an effort to improve the relationship between the media and the military, John

Scigenthaler, chairman of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, asked Frank A.
Aukofer and William P. Lawrence to work together on a plan that “might end the long

standing hostility and ease the never-ending tensions between the news media and the
military in the United States,” (Aukofer and Lawrence, v).

America’s Team: The Odd Couple is a year-long study researched and written by
retired Navy Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence and veteran journalist Frank A. Aukofer
at The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center in Nashville, Tenn. They brought
together a cross-section of colleagues from each side of the cultural conflict. Their
leadership turned those sessions into productive and positive exchanges. Honest concerns

and suspicions on both sides were brought into the open (Peterson, 1).

The report says journalists need to be better prepared to cover future military
operations. The military, meanwhile, is often secretive and bent on managing the flow of

news, according to some journalists quoted in the report.
Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, is one of 60 people

interviewed for the report, including six secretaries of defense, all the current directors of
public affairs, and numerous journalists. Many of the military people expressed outright

I
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contempt for journalists, and some journalists were equally critical of military leaders
(Peterson, 1).
Gen. Shalikashvili, said, “There are reporters...today who wouldn’t know a battalion

from a company, who wouldn’t know one airplane type from another. They have a

responsibility to become more professional and to get to know their job. We have a
responsibility, too, and a self interest in making sure they are knowledgeable. It isn’t just
knowing the piece of equipment, but to really help them understand what they’re seeing,

and then let them reach their own conclusions on the issues.”

John Sei genthaler, chairman of the First Amendment Center, observed, “There are
obviously a number of areas of conflict; mistrust, alienation and sometimes outright

hostility....The current work of Lawrence and Aukofer represents an effort to bring about
a greater understanding” between the two groups.

Based on recommendations by Congress and Gen. Shalikashvili, the Pentagon’s
various war colleges and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, in 1994 began
accepting private-sector civilians as students. As evidence of its commitment to upgrading

coverage of military affairs, The Associated Press agreed to Susanne Schafer’s suggestion
that she be nominated for study at the National War College. While both the media and the

military said for years that more training for journalists is desirable, trailblazer Schafer
probably will not be a trendsetter. It represents such a big commitment by the AP, says

Aukofer. Few outlets could afford to be without their military reporters for a year.
Conversely, Aukofer says local media leaders should engage in similar activities. He

also proposed a media-military office could fund and coordinate “military training for
news people... to get them out on training exercises. It could also put some combat
commanders in newsrooms to see how we operate.”
At the end of a panel discussion in June, 1995, in Arlington, Va., Aukofer concluded:

“Since undertaking this report, we’ve each worried and wondered if it was possible to get
a process whereby coverage of future conflicts could be improved.” Lawrence says, “The
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key is start talking now, because if we don’t plan in advance, everybody loses—-most of

all, the public,” (Peterson, 5). At the end of the study the following recommendations
were made as steps to ending the tensions between the military and media in the United
States:
1. The Department of Defense should consider adopting an overall policy of “security at

the source.” That would mean an end to field censorship. It would also mean that
escort officers would be used only to facilitate access for reporters and

photographers.
2. News media representatives should recognize that there may be extraordinary

circumstances in the future when civilian or military defense leaders might want to
exercise some temporary censorship in the interest of operational security or saving

lives. Guidelines for invoking that limited censorship should be developed.

3. Because of rapid advances in communications technology, news media and military
leaders should jointly engage in a study of the security issues posed by real-time
reporting from the battlefield.

4. Building on the concept of the Department of Defense National Media Pool, which
should be continued and improved upon for temporary use in secret operations, the
news media and the military should jointly establish the Independent Coverage Tier.

The system allows commanders to determine how many members of the news media

they could accommodate with units on the battlefield. For the news media, it would
provide guaranteed access, with proper support and protection, and without

censorship.

5. In major conflicts, such as Desert Storm, the secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider assigning an officer of general rank in the
combat theater to coordinate the news media aspects of the operation under the

commander of U.S. military forces.
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6. Foundations, including but not limited to such news-oriented organizations as The
Freedom Forum, the McCormick Tribune Foundation and the Knight Foundation,
should jointly establish an office of military media relations. The functions of the

office would include maintaining the institutional memory for the combat pool and tier

systems, facilitating discussions of real-time battlefield reporting, and developing
education and training programs for journalists and military men and women.
7. News organizations must make a better effort to cover military affairs, beginning at

the local level with coverage of National Guard, Reserve and ROTC units.
8. Where journalism schools and ROTC programs share campuses or geographic

locations, they should seek each other out for class visits or joint programs aimed at
increasing their knowledge and understanding of each other.

9. News media education provided by the professional military education system needs
to be improved through an integrated, building-block approach throughout the five
levels of the system.
10. The secretary of defense should consider expanding to other service colleges and

programs, which allows news media personnel to attend courses at the National War
College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
11. The armed forces should continue efforts to expand news media training as part of

field-training exercises and war games, affording the press the maximum

opportunity to participate.
12. The military services should continue efforts to enhance the effectiveness, prestige

and career attractiveness of public affairs officers.
13. The Department of Defense should abandon efforts to establish regulations defining

the qualifications of news media representatives.
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Conflict and public opinion: rallying effects of the Persian Gulf War

The media’s involvement in covering the Persian Gulf War was both necessary and
important to a successful military strategy and operation.

In the months before the Persian Gulf War, media analysts discussed at length whether

the American population would support military actions against Iraq. Many analysts

wondered whether the scars from the Vietnam War would create a public reluctance to
engage in another war on foreign soil (McLeod, et., 20).

There is considerable reason to believe that external and internal conflicts are an
important driving force behind the tides of public opinion. In fact, internal and external

conflict tend to have diametrically opposite effects on social dynamics. Ultimately, the
dynamics of social forces affect the composition of public opinion (McLeod, et., 21).

Internal conflicts, such as the Los Angeles riots in the aftermath of the trial of police
officers accused of beating Rodney King, tend to have a centrifugal effect. Internal

dissension tends to splinter various parties in the conflict, ultimately eroding the social
consensus.

By contrast, external conflicts such as the Persian Gulf War tend to have a centripetal

effect. Conflicts between one social group and an external group tend to increase
cohesion. External conflicts overshadow internal dissension, building the internal

consensus among group members. As extremely salient external conflicts, wars between

nations are particularly strong in mobilizing support behind objectives determined by the
power-holders within the system. When a major external conflict such as a war has been
initiated, formidable internal opposition to the conflict rarely exists. Typically, it takes a

long time for oppositional forces to evolve into a legitimized power base within the
system. Moreover, attempts at opposition are likely to be inhibited by agents of social

control such as mass media (McLeod, 20).

In their study Conflict and Public Opinion: Rallying Effects of the Persian Gulf War,
McLeod, Eveland, Jr., and Signorielli examined the dissipation of “rally effects” in the
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aftermath of the Persian Gulf War using data from a panel of 167 New Castle County
(Delaware) respondents interviewed during the war and one year later. Public support for
the war and confidence in the President, Congress, and the Military declined significantly.
Hostility toward anti-war protesters also diminished. The study combines the “rally
around the flag” literature from political science and functional conflict theory from

sociology to explain the impact of this major external conflict on support for government

institutions and intolerance for elements perceived as a potential threat (McLeod, 20). The

results of this study provided evidence consistent with dissipation of rally effects,

supporting the theoretical proposition that feelings of solidarity and support for established
authority peak during external conflict and declines thereafter.

Censorship and television news coverage of the Persian Gulf War

The canons of American journalism suggest that governments are not to be trusted,
and official attempts to restrict the free flow of information are the bane of a free press.

This adversarial depiction of the press suggests an actively critical role for journalists that
should be reflected in the content of their news. In time of war this presents a tension

between the professional responsibility to communicate the truth regardless of its effects
on the source and the allegiance to homeland. Throughout much of the Persian Gulf War,

the foreign press was allowed to report from Iraq—from behind enemy lines—and a
frequent criticism of their coverage was that due to tight controls journalists were being
used as propagandist tools (Newhagen).

The Persian Gulf War provided a unique opportunity to examine the relationship
between censorship and the emotional and critical tone of television news. Coverage of the
war was unique, not because censorship was taking place, but because news stories were

clearly labeled by disclaimers when they were aired. A total of 424 television news stories

broadcast during the Persian Gulf War were content analyzed for the presence or absence

of censorship disclaimers, the censoring source, and the producing network. The stories

20
also were rated for emotional valence and intensity, and critical tone of the story toward

the source. The results are discussed in terms of both production-and-viewer-based

differences (Newhagen, 32). Stories that contained disclaimers tended to be more

negative, more intense, and more critical than stories that did not, regardless of the
producing network. On the surface this seems to refute a set of hypotheses that predicted

successful censorship would result in a muted emotional tone (Newhagen, 40).

Additionally, contrary to the prediction, differences did emerge among networks. CNN

stood out in particular, airing stories that contained more disclaimers and that were more
positive, less intense, and less critical of sources than the other networks. The idea that the
United States tended to receive more positive, less intense, less critical coverage than Iraq

was supported for all five networks (Newhagen, 40).

The significance of the news media to soldiers
Several studies have shown that the media play a valuable role as a source of

information for soldiers during times of conflicts. A Survey of the 10th Mountain Division
(Light) Soldiers who deployed to Operation Uphold Democracy, was conducted by
Captain Janelie B. Roberts to determine the importance, availability and use of news and

media resources The purpose of Roberts’ study was to determine the value of news to the
soldiers and how much, how often, what kind, for what purpose and by what avenue they

received news.
Among other things she found that while deployed, soldiers primarily used media
resources for surveillance of the environment, primarily to find out what was happening
back in the U. S.

Two other studies related to Roberts’ study were conducted by Captain Joseph Piek

and Major John Suttle, United States Army.
Piek’s study, of which Roberts’ was a replication, surveyed enlisted Gulf War veterans

to determine the importance and availability of news. The most important information

21

gathered from his research was that enlisted soldiers became significantly more interested
in international and theater of operations news while they were deployed in support of a

mission (Piek, 63).

This highlights even more why the military is not only concerned with ensuring that
soldiers are kept well informed, but also that the information they receive shows the

public’s confidence in the military and their support for the war effort
Major Suttle’s study, the Command Information Function in U.S. Army Maneuver
Battalions During the Gulf War, found that 63% of the commanders said information lag

negatively affected their ability to provide troops with adequate information (Suttle, 63).
Also Suttle’s study showed that 57% of the commanders surveyed were dissatisfied with

the command information products available (Suttle, 68).

Summary
The literature reviewed above clearly indicate there is still some friction between the

military and the media. The main issues for the military seem to be the effect that media
coverage could have on safety and security. Using examples, Gen. Shalikashvili said,
“We all know the cases: the bright lights on the beach of Mogadishu as Marines are

attempting a night amphibious landing; the hundreds of reporters awaiting in Port-auPrince the night of the airborne assault, called off just hours before the sky was to have
been filled with paratroopers,” (Hernandez, 14).

Shalikashvili said, in Haiti, there was “the fear that the sky would have been

illuminated by a thousand white lights, making glowing ducks of our soldiers.” He added,
“What is less well known is that all major U.S. networks agreed to use night vision

devices instead of white lights and to delay broadcasting for some time until the troops
were safely on the ground. So, perhaps we are more tolerant of each other’s needs than is

generally believed, but we must continue to work at this issue,” (Hernandez, 14).
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According to former Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, the military has taken on the

task of improving what it must provide to journalists. The Pentagon is developing new
doctrine on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate
reporters on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools,

and field combat exercises now including training in working with journalists (Gersh).

However, much tension still exists between the military and news media.
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Method of Research
Primary research for this study was conducted using a mail survey. The survey was
made up of a series of statements designed to answer each research question and accept or

reject the hypotheses. Statements were included to determine the overall atmosphere of the

relationship between the 1st Armored Division and the media in Bosnia. Similar statements
were grouped. Verbal frequency and Likert scales were used (see appendix C).
The surveys were mailed to Maj. John E. Suttle, the 1st Armored Division’s Public

Affairs Officer (PAO), who agreed to distribute and collect the surveys.

Major Suttle, a Marshall University graduate in journalism and mass communications,
initially confirmed via the Internet, April 1, then again via letter April 20, 1996, his intent

to conduct the survey. He proved to be a valuable source of support because of his
position within the 1st Armored Division. Also, he conducted a similar research study

while a graduate student in Marshall University’s School of Journalism and Mass
Communications, three years ago.

Source of Data
The 1st Armored Division deployed to Bosnia in December, 1995, as part of a

peacekeeping mission. Approximately forty-six company commanders (Captains),
eighteen battalion commanders (Lieutenant Colonels), six brigade commanders

(Colonels), and the division commander, were the key leaders in command of troops.
Leaders in those key positions along with three division public affairs officers will
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comprise the population for this study. The goal was to survey the entire population and

receive an 80% return rate. However, a 66% return rate was received.

This population, although small in size, was chosen because of their position and the
integral role they play in the unit. Commanders at every level in the Army control

personnel and resources. In fact, every soldier in the Army falls under the command of an
officer. Commanders are responsible for everything their soldiers do or fail to do, which

includes breeches in informational and operational security (OPSEC). As a result,

commanders may conduct briefing about how to safeguard against OPSEC violations,
hand out media reference cards, and restrict the entrance of personnel, who may pose a

threat to OPSEC, into their unit area. Therefore, commanders were chosen because of
their position of authority and access they have to information that the average soldier is

not privy to. Public affairs officers were chosen because their job is to interface with

media personnel to help ensure that the reporters’ needs for gathering the news are met,
while making sure that the military is represented fairly.

Procedures for Gathering Information
An initial research proposal for this study was submitted to Dr. Harold C. Shaver,
professor and director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communications, April 22,

1996. Corrections were made in accordance with advice received from Dr. Shaver and a

copy of the submitted to each member of the research committee. After receiving advice

from committee members and making appropriate adjustments, a copy of the survey was
mailed to Maj. Mark Wiggins, at Ft. Bragg, N.C., for a pilot test.
After receiving the results from the pilot study, the researcher discussed them with the
committee chairman, Dr. Shaver, and made the necessary adjustments to the survey

instrument. About 100 surveys were packaged, inventoried, and mailed to Maj. Suttle by

registered and certified mail, on June 28, 1996.
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The following items were mailed:
•

An inventory sheet of all contents shipped

•

A letter of instructions and appreciation to Maj. Suttle

•

100 copies of the survey

•

A proposed schedule for collecting the data

Maj. Suttle received the surveys on July 10, distributed them to the designated units,
and collected them upon completion. Some units completed the surveys faster than others.
So, Maj. Suttle mailed the surveys to the researcher as he received them from the units. A

deadline of August 30 was established for collection of data. After that, the data were
submitted to a research technician, who entered the data into the computer using the

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-X).

The researcher interpreted the results of the survey with the help of Dr. Robert N.
Bickel, professor of educational leadership at Marshall University. A draft of the report

was submitted to members of the research committee October 4, 1996. Adjustments were
made to the report upon advice from the committee members, and the final draft was
submitted to the committee and Dean of the Graduate School on December 6,1996.

Explanation of Survey Instrument
The survey is a five-page questionnaire located at Appendix A. There are 29 questions
on the survey: 18 three-point verbal frequency scale type questions; three Likert scale
questions; and eight questions to gather background information on each subject. The
breakdown of questions and their subjects:

Q 13,9

Awareness of compromises in operational security
during mobilization, deployment, and mission phases.

Q

6,7,11

Support for members of the news media.

Q

2,10,14

Working relationship of military and media.

II
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Q

4, 5,8,12,13

Trust for media personnel.

Q

17,18

News media personnel’s knowledge of military.

Q

15, 16

News media’s respect for the military’s mission.

Q

19,21

Overall assessment of the news media.

Q

20

Importance of the media’s mission.

Q

22,29

Demographic information

Hypotheses/Question Correlation
The questions in the survey are designed to get responses that support or reject each of

the hypotheses in this study.
Hypotheses 1-3. Knowledge of reports published by news personnel that may

have compromised military operations decreases as rank, increases during : (1)
mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase, questions 1, 3, 9,

13, and 19 apply.

Hypothesis 4 - Commanders and public affairs officers’ trust of news media
personnel increases as rank increases, questions 4, 5, 8 apply.

Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted using four public affairs personnel from Fort Bragg,
N.C., who had been deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. The

purpose of the study was to survey personnel who had participated in the mission to
determine whether the research design and methodology were relevant and effective

(Wimmer and Dominick, 478). The pilot study was handled by Maj. Mark Wiggins, who

deployed to Bosnia as a public affairs detachment commander.
The researcher talked to Maj. Wiggins by telephone May 13, 1996, and he agreed to
conduct the test with his five-man public affairs team. Approximately 10 copies of the

survey were sent to Maj. Wiggins about June 14, by priority mail. He received the
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surveys and distributed them to the respondents. Once the surveys were completed by the
respondents Maj. Wiggins returned copies by facsimile to expedite the delivery. Four of

the five surveys were returned. The surveys and personal observations received over the
telephone from Maj. Wiggins were reviewed by the researcher and committee chairman,

and then, some minor adjustments were made to the survey instrument.

Treatment of Data
Frequency and percentage distributions are used to graphically display and compare

responses from verbal frequency and Likert scales on appropriate questions. Also, the

mean values of each dependent variable will be rank ordered for the purpose of
comparison.

Correlation analysis was used to determine whether a statistically significant
relationship existed between rank and previously specified dependent variables to help

form a basis for accepting or rejecting the established hypothesis. Also correlation
analyses were conducted to compare age with specified dependent variables.
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CHAPTER IV
Findings
Respondents9 Profile
The following information was collected from a survey of the commanders and
public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia. The data were collected from

the respondents between July 10 and August 30, 1996. An individual survey was

distributed to the 71 officers in the population. Forty-seven surveys were returned to the
researcher, and 40 of those were acceptable for analysis. Seven surveys were rejected

because they were completed by respondents outside of the designated population.
Therefore, the response rate was 66 percent, but the amount used was 57 percent of the

total surveys distributed. Table one shows the number and percentage of survey
responses.

Table 1. Survey response rate

number
percentage

population

distribution

71

71

100%

surveys
returned
47

66%

surveys used
40

surveys not
used
7

57%

10%

Rank. Officers surveyed for this study were lieutenants (Lts.), Captains (Capts.),
Majors (Majs.), lieutenant colonels (Ltcs.), and colonels (Cols.). The designated

population consisted of 45 Capts, 2 Majs., 18 Ltcs., and 6 Cols. As shown in chart 1, the
number of surveys returned by rank were 8 from Lts., 25 from Capts., 3 from Majs., 3

from Ltcs., 1 from a Col., and 7 were completed by noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

The surveys completed by NCOs were not used in the analysis of this study.
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Ages. Ages for the respondents are from 24 to 44 years-old. The mean age for
respondents in this study was 30.6 years. The mean ages by rank are Lts., 26; Capts.,

30.2; Majs., 34; Ltcs., 41.5; and Col., 43. Chart 2 graphically displays the repondents’
years of age by rank.

Chart 1. Survey responses by rank.

*Lts. are generally not company commanders, but usually hold the position in the commander’s absence.

Chart 2. Average age by rank.
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Gender. There were five female and 36 male respondents whose surveys were used as

part of this study. The gender for one respondent was not identified on the survey. Table
2 shows the distribution of respondents by gender.

Table 2 shows respondents by gender.
~
Males
|
Females
34

Unknown

5

1

Findings
The results in this study were prepared for analysis by coding all information gathered
from the survey instruments and entering the data into a computer using the Statistical

Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS-X). The scales used to record the responses of the
respondents were the verbal frequency and the Likert. The verbal frequency scale contains

five words that indicate how often an action has been taken. Advantages of the verbal
frequency scale include the ease of assessment and response by those being surveyed. The

number of opportunities to perform the action is automatically assumed within the

question. The Likert scale also uses five words to measure the respondents’ responses.
But, unlike the verbal frequency scale, the Likert scale states the issue or opinion and
obtains the respondents’ degree of agreement or disagreement. A major advantage of this
scale is the ability to obtain a summated value. Examples of the verbal frequency and

Likert scales are below.

Verbal frequency scale

Never

Infrequently

Some

(1)

(2)

(3)

Frequently

(4)

Very Frequently

(5)
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Likert scale

Strongly
Agree
(1)

Agree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

All data were entered into the computer by a single research technician, then analyzed
by comparing frequency and percentage distributions, and mean values of the variables.

Hypotheses were tested using correlation analysis. The remainder of this chapter will

present the findings of this research study.

Non-Hypotheses Findings
The majority of mean scores for survey questions shown in tables 3 and 4 indicate a
positive relation between the commanders and public relation officers of the 1st armored
Division, and the media. In questions 1,3, and 9, the mean scores indicated that
respondents were aware of some compromises in operational security. Mean scores for

questions 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 14 indicated they were frequently supportive and
cooperative with media personnel. Questions 4,5, 8, 12, and 13 indicated that they

frequently trusted news media personnel. Questions 15 and 16 indicated that news media
personnel infrequently interfered with meetings or training to conduct interviews. The
respondents, in questions 17 and 18, neither agreed nor disagreed that news media

personnel understood the military’s need for operational security or that they had adequate
knowledge about military operations to know what they were reporting. Finally, in

questions 19 and 20, respondents neither agreed nor disagreed that news media coverage
did not risk their unit’s operational security, or that the media’s mission was just as

important as the military’s.
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Table 3. Survey questions 1-16 ranked from most positive to least positive responses
using the verbal frequency scale.

Survey Questions

Percentage of
Positive
Responses
85

Average
Mean

79

3.95

3. Q12. My soldiers were provided with media reference
cards to deal with news media personnel.

78

3.90

4. Q6. When asked questions by news media personnel, I
was able to provide answers quickly enough to satisfy the
needs of media people, including their deadlines.__________
5. Q2. News media personnel were cooperative and easy to
work with.

77

3.85

76

3.79

6. Q3. I know of news media personnel who deceptively
gained access to unauthorized information or locations

74

1.28*

7. Q10. I welcomed members of the news media into my
unit area.

73

3.67

8. Q5. The information in news media reports about my
unit’s operations were correct.

70

3.48

9. Q14. News media personnel displayed a real concern for
the well being of soldiers in my unit.

67

3.34

10. Q4. News media reports were impartial.

65

3.27

11. Q8. I know of an instance (or instances) that news
media personnel reported information they had previously
said would be off the record.__________________________
12. Q16. News media personnel interfered with important
meetings seeking interviews with soldiers.

65

1.75*

65

1.76*

13. Q15. News media personnel interfered with training
seeking interviews with soldiers.

63

1.86*

14. Q13. Do you think that the presence of media
personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security.

54

2.28

1. Q7. When answering news media personnel questions
about my unit’s operations, I always provided correct
information.
______
2. Qll. When media personnel requested access to my
unit’s area to interview soldiers, it was granted.

51
15. Q1.1 know of reports published by the news media
that may have risked the operational security of our
mission.__________________________________ _________
49
16. Q9. Did media personnel ask questions that could not
be answered without risking your unit’s operational
security.__________________________________________________________________

* Questions were negatively worded and the preferred answer is closer to one.

4.20

2.44
2.53
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Table 4. Survey questions 17-21 ranked from most positive to least positive responses
using the Likert scale.
Survey Questions

Percentage of
Positive
Responses
58

Average
Mean

2. Q17. News media reporters seemed to have adequate
knowledge about military operations to know what they
were reporting.______________________________________
3. Q18. News media personnel seemed to understand the
military’s need for operational security.

58

2.88

55

2.73

4. Q21. The military-media relationship has improved
since the gulf war.

54

2.70

5. QI9. Overall, news media coverage did not risk my
unit’s operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor.

48

2.42

1. Q20. The media’s mission is just as important to
society as the military’s mission.

2.90

The questions in table 3 and 4 are listed from most positive to least positive
responses. Column one shows the percent of respondents who provided positive

responses to the question. Column two shows the average mean response to each
question. The mean scores are interpreted using the verbal frequency scale for Table 3 and

the Likert scale for Table 4.

Hypotheses* Each hypothesis was tested by correlating the previously designated

survey questions (dependent variables) with rank (independent variable) to measure the
association between the two variables. “Correlation is based on covariance, or movement

of the variables together. Correlation analysis generates a single value (the correlation
coefficient) that shows how much the two variables move together. The correlation

coefficient, is symbolized by the letter r. It ranges from a value of zero, indicating there is
no relationship between the variables, to a plus or minus one, indicating a perfect linear

relationship. If the correlation is positive, the two move in the same direction. If it is

negative, they move in the opposite direction. The plus or minus sign indicates a direct or
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an inverse relationship between the two variables. The proportion of shared variance is

indicated by the square of the correlation coefficient, and is called the coefficient of
determination, symbolized by r2 or abbreviated as RSQ,” (Alreck and Settle, 197).

Hl-3. Knowledge of reports published by the news media that may have

compromised military operations decreases as rank increases during:
(1) mobilization phase

(2) deployment phase
(3) mission phase

Survey questions 1,3,9, 13, and 19 were designed to collect information to test

hypotheses 1-3. The survey questions and results are as follows:
(1). Question 1. / know of reports published by the news media that may have

risked the operational security of our mission.
The results from Table 3 indicate that 21 percent of the respondents had no knowledge
of reports published by the news media that may have risked the operational security of the

unit’s mission. Other responses indicated that 33 percent of the respondents had

Table 5 shows responses to question 1.1 know of reports published by the news media
that may have risked the operational security of our mission.
Mobilization
Phase
7

Deployment
Phase
9

Mission
Phase
9

Average
Response
8.3

percentage

Infrequently

13

11

16

13.3

33%

Sometimes

12

12

10

11.3

28%

Frequently

7

7

5

6.3

16%

Very Frequently

1

1

0

.7

2%

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

21%
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knowledge of such reports infrequently, 28 percent of the respondents had some
knowledge of such reports, 16 percent of the respondents had knowledge of such reports

frequently, and 2 percent of the respondents had knowledge of such reports very
frequently. Chart 3 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 1.

Chart 3. Percentage of responses for question 1.1 know of reports published by the
news media that may have risked the operational security of our mission.

Percentage
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...............
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VF Very
Frequently
M Missing
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some

freq
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(2). Question 3. I know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to

unauthorized information or locations.
Results from Table 6 indicate that 76 percent of the respondents have no knowledge of

news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or
locations during Operation Joint Endeavor. Other responses indicate that 19 percent have

knowledge of such acts occurring infrequently, 3 percent have knowledge of such acts

occurring sometime, and 2 percent have knowledge of such acts occurring frequently.

Chart 4 displays the average percentage of each verbal frequency category for question 3.
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Table 6. Responses to question 3.1 know of news media personnel who deceptively
gained access to unauthorized information or locations.

Mobilization
Phase
32

Deployment
Phase

Infrequently

30

Mission
Phase
30

Average
Response
30.7

Average
percentages
76%

6

9

8

7.6

19%

Sometimes

1

1

1

1

3%

Frequently

1

0

1

.7

2%

Very Frequently

0

0

0

0

0

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

Chart 4. Percentage of responses for question 3. I know of news media personnel who
deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or locations.
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(3). Question 9. Did media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without

risking your unit ’s operational security?
Results shown in Table 7 indicate that 28 percent of the respondents had no knowledge

of media personnel asking questions that could not be answered without risking their unit’s
operational security. Other responses indicated that 18 percent had knowledge of media

personnel asking such questions infrequently, 18 percent had knowledge of media
personnel asking such questions sometimes, 25 percent had knowledge of media personnel

I
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asking such questions frequently, and 3 percent had knowledge of media personnel asking
questions that could not be answered without risking their unit’s operational security very

frequently. Eight percent of the respondents did not answer question 9. Chart 5 graphically

displays the percentage of responses for verbal frequency category for question 9.

Table 7. Responses to question 9. Did media personnel ask questions that could not be
answered without risking your unit's operational security?
Mobilization
Phase
11

Deployment
Phase
12

Mission
Phase
11

Average
Response
11.3

Average
percentages
28%

Infrequently

6

8

7

7

18%

Sometimes

7

7

7

7

18%

Frequently

11

8

11

10

25%

Very Frequently

1

2

1

1.3

3%

Missing

4

3

3

3.3

8%

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

Chart 5. Percentage of responses for question 9. Did media personnel ask questions that
could not be answered without risking your unit's operational security?
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(4). Question 13. Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a

threat to operational security?

Results shown in Table 8 indicate that 30 percent of the respondents did not think the
presence of media personnel in their units were a threat to operational security. Other

responses indicated that 27 percent thought they were a risk infrequently, 29 percent
thought they were a risk sometimes, 4 percent said they were a risk frequently, 7 percent

said they were a risk very frequently, and 3 percent did not answer the question. Chart 6
graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 13.

Table 8. Responses to question 13. Do you think that the presence of media personnel in
your unit area was a threat to operational security ?
Mobilization
Phase
13

Deployment
Phase
12

Mission
Phase

n

Average
Response
12

Average
percentages
30%

Infrequently

9

11

12

10.7

27%

Sometimes

12

10

13

11.7

29%

Frequently

1

3

1

1.7

4%

Very Frequently

3

3

2

2.7

7%

Missing

2

1

1

1.3

3%

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

39

Chart 6. Percentage of responses to question 13. Do you think that the presence of media
personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security?
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(5). Question 19. Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit's operational

security during Operation Joint Endeavor.

Results shown in Table 9 indicate that 8 percent of the respondents strongly agree that
overall, news media coverage did not risk their unit’s operational security during Operation

Joint Endeavor. Other responses indicated 60 percent agreed, 17 percent neither agreed nor
disagreed, 13 percent disagreed, and 2 percent strongly disagreed. Chart 7 graphically

displays the percentage of responses for question 19.
Table 9. Responses to question 19. Overall, news media coverage did not risk my unit’s
operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor.

Frequency

Percentage

Strongly agree

3

8%

Agree

24

60%

Neither A or D

7

17%

Disagree

5

13%

Strongly Disagree

1

2%

Total

40

100%

40

Chart 7. Percentage of responses to question 19. Overall, news media coverage did not
risk my unit’s operational security during Operation Joint Endeavor.
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Test of hypotheses 1-3. Correlation analyses were conducted between rank and
each designated dependent variable (questions 1, 3, 9, 13, and 19) to test for associations
of statistical significance at the .05 level. The results shown in Table 10, indicate that no

statistically significant associations were found between rank and the dependent variables in

any phases of the deployment.

Table 10. Correlation coefficients between rank and the designated dependent variables
below.
Dependent Variables
1.1 know of reports published by the news media
that may have risked the operational security of our
mission._________________________________ _
3.1 know of news media personnel who deceptively
gained access to unauthorized information or
locations._____________________________ ___
9. Did news media personnel ask questions that
could not be answered without risking your unit’s
operational security.________________________
13. Do you think that the presence of media
personnel in your unit was a threat to operational
security.___

P < .05 for all calculations

Mobilization

Deployment

Mission

.2354

.2974

-.0090

.0356

.0450

-.0156

-.0510

-.0548

.0281

.0163

.0131

.0484
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Therefore, hypotheses 1-3, are not supported. They stated Knowledge of reports

published by the news media that may have compromised military operations decreases as
rank increases during; (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission
phase.

Hypotheses 4-6. Commanders’ and public affairs officers’ trust of news media
personnel increases as rank increases during;

(1) mobilization phase
(2) deployment phase
(3) mission phase

Survey questions 4, 5, and 8 were designed to collect information that would either
support or reject hypotheses 4-6. The survey questions and their results follow.
(1) Question 4. News media reports were impartial.
Results shown in Table 11 indicate that 9 percent of the respondents thought news

media reports were never impartial. Other responses indicate that 10 percent thought they
were infrequently impartial, 31 percent thought they were sometimes impartial, 40 percent

thought they were frequently impartial, 8 percent thought they were very frequently

Table 11. Responses to question 4. News media reports were impartial.
Mobilization
Phase
4

Deployment
Phase
4

Mission
Phase
3

Average
Response
3.7

Average
Percentage
9%

Infrequently

4

4

4

4

10%

Sometimes

9

13

15

12.3

31%

Frequently

19

15

14

16

40%

Very Frequently

3

3

3

3

8%

Missing

1

1

1

1

2%

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

1
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impartial and 2 percent did not respond to the question. Chart 8 graphically displays the

percentage of responses for question 4.

Chart 8. Percentage of responses to question 4. News media reports were impartial .
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40 <T"

—

___________ i

■■I

30
20

-

Scale

N Never
1 Infrequently

31%

S
——

irXWo-H I
N

s

Sometimes

F Frequently
VF Vety
Frequently

• ?■

wH

04

a

0%

M Missing
F

VF

M

(2). Question 5. The information in news media reports about my unit* s operations

was correct.
Results shown in Table 12 indicate that 5 percent of the respondents thought the
information in news media reports about their unit’s operations was never correct. Others

responses indicated that 7 percent thought they were infrequently correct, 31 percent
thought they were sometimes correct, 45 percent thought they were frequently correct, 10

percent thought they were very frequently correct, and 2 percent did not respond to the

statement. Chart 9 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 5.
(3). Question 8. 1 know of an instance (instances) that news media personnel reported

information they had previously said would be off the record.
Results shown in Table 13 indicate that 56 percent of the respondents never knew of an

instance (instances) when news media personnel reported information they had previously

said would be off the record. Other responses indicated that 17 percent knew of instances
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Table 12. Responses to question 5. The information in news media reports about my
unit's operations was correct.

Mobilization
Phase
2

Deployment
Phase
2

Mission
Phase
2

Average
Response
2

Average
Percentage
5%

Infrequently

3

4

2

3

7%

Some

12

9

16

12.3

31%

Frequently

18

21

15

18

45%

Very Frequently

4

4

4

4

10%

Missing

1

0

1

.7

2%

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

Chart 9. Percentage of responses to question 5. The information in news media reports
about my unit's operations was correct.

infrequently, 17 percent knew of instances sometimes, 5 percent knew of instances

frequently, 3 percent knew of instances very frequently, and 2 percent did not respond to
the question. Chart 10 graphically displays the percentage of responses for question 8.
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Table 13. Responses to question 8.1 know of an instance (instances) that news media
personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the record.

Mobilization
Phase
25

Deployment
Phase
22

Mission
Phase
21

Average
Response
22.6

Average
Percentage
56%

Infrequently

5

7

8

6.7

17%

Sometimes

7

6

7

6.7

17%

Frequently

1

2

3

2

5%

Very Frequently

2

2

0

1.3

3%

Missing

0

1

1

.7

2%

40

40

40

40

100%

Never

Total

Chart 10. Percentage of responses to question 8.1 know of an instance (or instances)
that news media personnel reported information they had previously said would be off the
record.
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Test of hypotheses 4-6. Correlation analyses were conducted between rank and

each designated dependent variable (questions 4, 5, and 8) to test for relationship of

statistical significance at the .05 level. Results shown in Table 14 indicate that no

statistically significant relationships were found between rank and the dependent variables
in any phases of the deployment.
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Therefore, hypotheses 4-6, are not supported. They statedCommanders and public
affairs officers trust of news media personnel increases as rank increases during; (1)

mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase.

Table 14 shows the correlation coefficients between rank and the designated dependent
variables below.
Dependent Variables

Mobilization

Deployment

Mission

4. News media reports were impartial

-.1444

-.1426

-.1849

5. The information in news media reports about my
unit's operations were correct._______________
8. I know of an instance (or instances) that news
media personnel reported information they had
previously said would be off the record._________

-.0332

-.0151

-.1650

.1530

.1823

.1213

P < .05 for all calculations

Findings of Significance
Although no findings of significance were discovered when rank was correlated with

each survey question, five statistically significant relationships were found when age was
used.
Table 15 shows that all five correlations are positive, which means that they move in the

same direction. Three of the relationships were found with question 4, news media reports
were impartial. Two of the correlations were significant at the .01 level, in the mobilization

and mission phase. The third one was at the .05 level, in the deployment.

The other two correlations were also significant at the .05 level. One was found with
question 1,1 know of reports published by the news media that may have risked the
operational security of our mission, during the mission phase. The second was found with

question 10,1 welcomed members of the media into my unit area, during the mobilization

phase.
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Table 15. Correlation coefficients between age and the designated dependent variables
below. The level for significance was set at .05
Dependent Variables

Mobilization

Deployment

Mission

1. I know of reports published by the news media
that may have risked the operational security of our
mission_____________________________________
4. News media reports were impartial

.0517

.0145

.3576*

.4528**

.4867**

.3406*

10. I welcomed members of the media into my unit
area._________________________

.3292*

.2522

.2594

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to survey the commanders and public affairs officers
who were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia with the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division

as part of Operation Joint Endeavor for their views about how they think the media affected
their unit’s operational security.
Overall, the responses of commanders and public affairs officers were positive toward

media personnel in the area of operational security and trust. The remainder of this chapter

will discuss demographics, hypotheses, findings of statistical significance, non-hypothesis

findings, implications for the knowledge gap theory, and recommendations.

Demographics
Survey population and response rate. Population size for this survey was 71
respondents (see appendix D). The respondents were mostly company, battalion, and
brigade commanders of the 1st Armored Division.

Sixty-nine percent of the survey population returned their surveys and 59 percent were
used in the survey. The 10 percent not used were completed by noncommissioned officers,

who were not serving in a command or public affairs positions. The response rate was

expected to be about 80 percent because the unit was somewhat centrally located and
because the person collecting the information had prior experience conducting a similar
study. Officers with the lowest survey response rates were the colonels and lieutenant

colonels. Each returned about two percent of the surveys. The low response rate among
field grade officers may have occurred for at least two reasons.

First, there were severe time constraints. The total time available for distributing the

survey and collecting data was about two months. This was difficult because it took
approximately two weeks for the surveys to arrive in Bosnia and about the same time for
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them to be returned to West Virginia from Bosnia. This allowed the data collector only

about 20 days to distribute, collect, and return the data ( see schedule at appendix A, p2 ).
Second, commanders and PAOs may have been too busy. This may be true, because

not only are commanders concerned with the usual task of taking care of their soldiers and

accomplishing the mission, but they are also challenged to maintain the morale of soldiers
who are thousands of miles away from home. Additionally, the high visibility of the
mission and possibility that one mistake could be seen on news around the world in a short

time may increase the commanders’ work load. PAOs, undoubtedly, have their hands full

with regular responsibilities, plus additional tasks such as publishing unit newsletters and
planning for regular visits with dignitaries from around the world.

Rank. There was a noticeable difference in the response rate of company grade
officers (Capts. and Lts.) and field grade officers (Majs., Ltcs., and Cols.). Company

grade officers returned 73 percent of the surveys, while field grade officers returned only
27 percent. One explanation for the difference in response may be related to the levels of
responsibility. For example, a captain commanding a heavy armored company has an

authorized personnel strength of 63 troops. Whereas, a lieutenant colonel commanding a
heavy armored battalion has an authorized personnel strength of 552 troops, and a colonel
commanding a heavy Armored brigade has an authorized personnel strength of 2,028

troops (Staff, 149). Therefore, as rank increases responsibility increases, which may be
one reason why fewer field grade officers returned their surveys.
Age. There is about a four-year difference between the average ages of the various

ranks. Although there appears to be a positive relationship between age and rank,

correlation analysis shows no significant relationship exists in this study. This might be
due in part to the wide range in ages for each rank. For example, in this study the average
age for captains is 30.2 years and the average age for majors is 34 years. However, the age

of captains range from 28 to 34 years-old and majors’ ages range from 32 to 34 years-old.
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This shows an overlap of about two years between majors and captains, which may help

explain why there is no significant relationship between age and rank.
Gender. Over 85 percent of the respondents to this survey were male. This difference

is due to the small number of females who are assigned to the 1st Armored Division.
Females generally are not allowed to be assigned to positions within the combat arms
branch. The female respondents in this study were mostly from combat service support

units.

Non-hypothesis findings
The overall responses of commanders and public relations officers of the 1st Armored
Division to statements about the media’s risk to operational security and their trust of news

media personnel were positive. However, a comparison of the responses to statements on

the survey, shown in Table 3, reveal that respondents think news media personnel
sometimes risked the operational security of their units’ mission. Also, three of four

questions related to operational security received the least percentage of positive responses.
Additionally, the study indicated that news media personnel frequently published reports
that were impartial and contained correct information. Such positive reports indicate the

trust respondents have in the news media. Finally, the responses indicated that military and

media personnel were frequently cooperative and supportive of one another’s mission. This
indicates a positive step in the military and media’s effort to improve their relationship.

Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1-3, are not supported. They stated Knowledge of reports published by

the news media that may have compromised military operations decreased as rank increases
during; (1) mobilization phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase. There were

no correlations of significance found to exist between rank and the dependent variables
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tested. The correlation coefficients ranged from slightly negative (-.0548) to moderately
positive (.2974), but none reached the .05 level of significance.

The rejection of the above hypotheses was not consistent with what the researcher
expected to find based on related research conducted previously by Snyder and Payne.
Their study found that “personal knowledge of information released by military public

affairs personnel that may have compromised military operations, significantly correlated,

negatively, with demographic variables of rank, months of public affairs experience, and
with military public affairs schooling.” (Snyder and Payne, 38).
There are at least three possible explanations for why this study’s results differ from

those of Snyder and Payne’s. First, the gap of knowledge among ranks may have been
significantly reduced since the Gulf War, as it relates to the military-media relationship.

Also, this may indicate that the military-media effort to improve their relationship is paying
off (Aukofer and Lawrence, v). Second, the differences may be because of the small
population size of the study. Finally, the low response rate of senior ranking officers may

have affected the results.

Hypotheses 4-6, are not supported. They statedCommanders and public affairs

officers trust of news media personnel increases as rank increases during; (1) mobilization

phase, (2) deployment phase, and (3) mission phase. There were no relationships of
significance found between rank and the dependent variables tested. The correlation

coefficients ranged from slightly negative (-.1849) to slightly positive (.1823). Although
there were more negative than positive correlations, none reached the .05 level of
significance.

As with hypotheses 1-3, the results in hypotheses 4-6 were not consistent with what
was expected, based on Snyder and Payne’s research. In addition to the findings

discussed earlier, also Snyder and Payne found that rank significantly correlated with
positive views of news coverage. “The higher the rank, the more positive their attitudes
were that news media provided fair and accurate reporting during Desert Storm,” (Snyder
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and Payne, 27). The differences in the results of this study and the findings of Snyder and

Payne may be due to the same explanations given earlier for hypotheses 1-3.

Findings of Significance. Although no findings of significance were
discovered when rank was correlated with each survey question, five statistically
significant associations were found when age was used. With question one, I know of
reports published by the media that may have risked the operational security of our

mission, there was a statistically significant relationship found in the mission phase only.

The relationship is positive, which means that the two variables move in the same direction.

Therefore, as age increases, knowledge of reports published by the media that may risk
operational security of the mission increases.

Statistically significant relationships between age and question 4, News media reports
were impartial, were found to exist in all phases of the operation. In mobilization and

deployment phase they were significant at the .01 level. All three relationships were
positive, which means that older respondents were more aware of news reports published
by the media that were impartial. Therefore, they were more likely to trust news media

personnel.

Finally, there was a statistically significant relationship between age and statement 10,1

welcomed members of the media into my unit area, during the mobilization phase only. The
relationship was positive, which means that as age increased the respondents were more

likely to welcome news media personnel into their unit areas. Therefore, older respondents
were, according to their self-report, more friendly to news media personnel.

These findings, however, present somewhat of a paradox. That is, while older
respondents are more likely to know of reports published by the news media that may have

risked operational security, also they are more likely to trust and be friendly to media
personnel.
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Possible explanations for this paradox require a brief discussion about each of the

findings above. First, older respondents may be more likely to know of reports published
by the news media that may have risked operational security because they usually have
more time in military service than younger soldiers. Also, they may have more experience
working with the media. Therefore, they may recognize more readily reports published by
the news media that may have risked operational security than younger and perhaps lesser

experienced soldiers. Second, trust in this study is measured in terms of correct and
impartial reports published by the news media. Therefore, questions concerning trust are

not necessarily related to operational security. For example, the news media may publish a
story that correctly identifies the location and activities of a unit, however, if the
information is obtained by enemy personnel, it could pose a risk to the unit’s operational

security. Third, being friendly is probably the right thing to do. Also, many officers are
aware of the importance of the media and may seek to build a positive relationship with

reporters.

Implications for the Knowledge Gap Theory

The knowledge gap theory which formed the theoretical basis for this study was not
supported. The theory says “as the infusion of mass media information into a social system

increases, segments of the population with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to
acquire this information at a faster rate than the lower status segments, so that the gap in

knowledge between these segments tends to increase rather than decrease (Gaziano, 4).
The purpose of using the knowledge gap theory was to help explain the expected

differences in opinions between lower ranking officers, and higher ranking officers as
proposed in hypothesis 1-6. However, the results of the study indicated that no statistically

significant relationships were found between rank and the dependent variables designed to

test the hypotheses. Therefore, hypotheses 1-6 and the knowledge gap theory were not
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supported by this study. Possible explanations for these findings were given earlier in the
chapter when discussing hypotheses 1-3.

Recommendations
This study clearly shows that the respondents think a positive relationship exists
between the commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division, and the

media. However, in most of the open-ended comments in appendix A, respondents say

that publication of unit locations, strengths, and movement routes are their main concerns
about the media and operational security. These statements along with findings in this study

indicate that continued efforts to improve relationships between the military and media are

necessary.
Further research of value to this study would be to conduct a similar study to obtain the
views of media personnel who covered stories in Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor.

This would help to give balance to the findings of this study. Also a replication of this
study using a larger population may provide a better picture of the relationship between

rank and dependent variables. Finally, it may be of some value to conduct a similar study
that focuses on age as the independent variable.

Executive Summary
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to survey the commanders and public affairs officers
who were mobilized and deployed to Bosnia with the U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Division
as part of Operation Joint Endeavor, for their views about how they think the media
affected their unit’s operational security.

Research Questions
The research questions were:
1) How do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in
Bosnia think media coverage affected their unit’s operational security during Operation
Joint Endeavor?
2) Do commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia
think they can trust news media personnel?

Demographics
o
o

Survey response rate. Sixty six percent (40/71)
Rank. There were 33 company grade officers ( 25 captains and 8 lieutenants) and 7
field grade officers ( 3 majors, 3 lieutenant colonels, and 1 colonel).
Age. The age of respondents ranged from 24 to 34 years-old. The ages by rank were
Lts. 26.1, Capts. 30.2, Majs. 34, Ltcs. 41.5, and Col. 43. The mean age was 30.6.

Findings
The overall responses of commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st Armored
Division to statements about the media’s risk to operational security and their trust of news
media personnel were positive. A comparison of the mean scores for responses to
statements on the survey reveal that respondents think media personnel infrequently risked
the security of their units’ mission. Other finding included:
• Hypotheses 1-6 were not supported. There were no correlations of significance found
to exist between rank and the dependent variables tested.
• When age was used as an independent variable there were five statistically significant
associations found. The relationship was positive, which mean they move in the same
direction. Dependent variables affected were Questions 1 (mission phase), 4
(mobilization, deployment, and mission phases), and 10 (mobilization phase).

Recommendation
Further research of value to this study would be to conduct a similar study to obtain the
views of media personnel who covered stories in Bosnia during Operation Joint Endeavor.
This would help to give balance to the findings of this study. Also a replication of this
study using a larger population size and perhaps gathering more samples may provide a
better picture of the relationship between rank and the dependent variables. Finally, it may
be of some value to conduct a similar study that focuses on age as the independent
variable.
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APPENDIX A
Soldiers’ Comments
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Soldiers’ Comments
At the end of each survey the respondents were given the opportunity to respond to the

following question. W/iaZ are the main concerns you have about how the media

affect your unit’s operational security?

Survey 1: “I believe the media has developed more responsibility toward OPSEC. I think
the media needs to be more aware of how unconfirmed stories can affect morale, i.e.

redeployment.”
Survey 6: “If we were in combat, I would definitely be more concerned and less excited
about the media’s presence.”
Survey 7:

1) “Camera shots of security arrangements” 2) “Names of soldiers—telling

where they are from and where their families live” 3) “Talk about movement plans, routes,
and times”
Survey 09: 1) “The operational readiness and/or capabilities during mobilization and

deployment stages.” 2) “There are times when the reports are more subjective than what
they otherwise should be.”

Survey 10:

“Changing the context of comments made by soldiers to suit the purposes of

the media.”

Survey 12: “Media creating a false perception of military strength, mission orientation
and capabilities.”
Survey 17: “Unit locations and strengths in Bosnia. For example, the Star & Stripes

published, twice, all base camp locations by name, units, and strengths. S&S constantly

published stories concerning morale that an adversary could use. The major media tracked

the SAVA RIVER crossing that an enemy could have used to hinder an already fragile
operation.”
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Survey 24: “My main concern is the JIB did little, actually nothing, to sell the Task

Force’s story to the media. My other concern is that two of the three MPADs in this
operation essentially failed in their mission. Neither was held accountable—SHAMEFUL!”

Survey 25: “Not so much the media as compared with having PA Os operate as PA Os
without the necessary training or skill sets! Not 1 AD PAO! Only referring to mobilized

reservists. Your survey assumes that the media are the problem. I think the military needs
to look at its own PAO development program.”

Survey 26: “That they understand I have a job to do and they let me do it —and I’ll let
them report what the public should know within operational constraints.”

Survey 28: “Because almost none of the journalist have spent a day in uniform, they
don’t understand operational security. Without the experience there is no understanding.”

Survey 29: “With regard to mobilization, it was not comforting to see Stars and Stripes
outline (with maps) exact routes and camp locations. The situation when we arrived, was

uncertain at best. Anyone interested knew exactly where we would be before we got here.

The possibilities for this information are endless.”
Survey 30: “None, well prepared leaders and soldiers can turn the media into a “combat
multiplier” for a unit. Ill prepared leaders and soldiers will certainly suffer from media

coverage.”
Survey 32: “Not enough exposure! The local nationals should see/hear news about the
Apache, and should know that we can see them day/night, record it, and bring proof of

what we see. ”

Survey 36:

“I want to be able to assist the media, but sometimes I feel that my mission

as a PAO and my mission to support the brigade is at odds. There are so many checks and
balances I have to go through before I can assist the media that I often feel ineffective at my

job.”

Survey 37:

“Redeployment rules, dates, and times—family expectations rise—and

OPSEC is totally compromised.”
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Survey 42: “During deployment and mission they (the media) became bored quickly and
therefore looked for something sensational to get their story noticed by the wire. Stars &

Stripes disappointed me the most. It is not the same paper it was during my experiences
with it in the 80’s when the personnel were a good deal of ex military who knew what they
were dealing with. Now they just are an out of context and out of touch group of

reporters.”

Survey 44: “Tell half truths, erode the morale”
Survey 47: “Knowing what will be reported, how events will be interpreted by the

media — they could unintentionally compromise OPSEC.”
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APPENDIX B
Survey Cover Letter
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Marshall University

W. Page Pitt School of Journalism and Mass Communications
320 Smith Hall, Huntington, West Virginia 25755
June 28, 1996
Major John E. Suttle
Public Affairs Officer
HQS 1st Armored Division
Operation Joint Endeavor
APO AE 09789
SUBJECT: Survey for thesis project

Hello Maj. Suttle,
How are you and the troops of the 1st Armored Division? I
hope all is well. I try to keep abreast of the news about your
mission by reading the newspaper and watching CNN.
Enclosed with this letter are approximately 100 copies of
the research survey. From the information you sent me earlier I
estimated the survey population to be about 85 personnel.
However, if you need additional survey forms please make copies
of one of the enclosed surveys and I'll reimburse you for the
cost.
The survey population includes the company, battalion, and
brigade commanders and public affairs officers from the following
units:

1st AR BDE
2nd AR BDE
4th BDE (AVN)
DISCOM
DIV ENG
DIVARTY
Separate Units
After the data have been collected for the entire population
or for as many participants as you can get, please send the
surveys to me at: 62 00 Curry Ave. Apt.#l, Huntington, West
Virginia 25705.
I will reimburse you for mailing the information to me as
soon as I receive the cost from you.
Thank you very much for your help. Without your assistance
this project would have been nearly impossible to accomplish as a
graduate student here at Marshall.
A proposed schedule for collecting the data is enclosed for
your information.
J -

J/v
ANGION
/STANFORD E. ANG1
CPT, IlJ
Project Officer
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A proposed schedule for collecting the data is as follows:
Apr. 22

Submit survey to Dr. Shaver

May 06

Receive survey from Dr. Shaver and make corrections

May 13

Submit corrected copy to research committee members and Dr. Bickel

May 13-31 Research committee members and Dr. Bickel review survey and provide

feedback.
June 1-10 Make corrections from research committee members and Dr. Bickel findings.

June 11-12 Review corrected survey with Dr. Shaver.

June 14

Send copies for pilot test to Maj. Wiggins Ft. Bragg (priority mail)

June 17

Maj. Wiggins receives information and conducts survey.

June 20

Maj. Wiggins provides initial feedback by phone and send completed surveys

researcher by mail.
June 20-24 Researcher discusses results from initial feedback with research committee
members and make appropriate changes.

June 24

Researcher receives completed surveys from Maj. Wiggins and reviews them.

June 24-25 Researcher confers with research committee and makes changes based on

results from pilot surveys.
June 26

Researcher prepares survey package for Maj. Suttle.

June 27 Researcher mail survey package to Maj. Suttle

July 5

Maj. Suttle receives survey package

July 8-29 Maj. Suttle distributes packages and collects data

July 30

Maj. Suttle mails surveys to researcher

Aug. 6

Researcher receives surveys and analyze and interpret data.

Sept. 3

Researcher submits first draft of thesis report to research committee members
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APPENDIX C
Survey Instrument
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Appendix A
Please DO NOT put your name on this survey.

This survey is part of a study to determine how commanders and public affairs officers of the 1st
Armored Division in Bosnia think media coverage affected operational security during mobiliza
tion, deployment, and the mission while in Bosnia. The survey is to be completed by company,
battalion, and brigade commanders and public affairs officers who deployed to OPERATION
JOINT ENDEAVOR.
Please do your best to answer each question accurately. Your answers will help provide some
immediate feedback to Army officials concerning the effects that the media are having on troops in
Bosnia. It may also be used as a source of information for the 1st Armored Division’s ongoing
mission in Bosnia.
You will not be identified with the answers on this survey

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Operational security - Information about the unit’s personnel, equipment and/or plans that if obtained
by the enemy could adversely affect the mission.
Mobilization Phase- Period of time from which the unit was officially notified of the mission up to the
time of departure of the first troops.
Deployment Phase- Period of time from which the first soldiers departed the 1st Armored Division
enroute to Bosnia up to the time of official assumption of the mission.
Mission Phase- Period of time during which thelst Armored Division assumed mission.

News Media- Civilian television, radio, newspapers, magazines, etc...

Directions: Please use the following numerical frequency scale when responding to questions 1-16 only.
Circle your response. Be sure to respond to every item. For example, for question one, you will circle a
response for mobilization, deployment, and mission phases.

NEVER
(1)

INFREQUENTLY
(2)

VERY FREQUENTLY
(5)

FREQUENTLY
(4)

SOME
(3)

1. I know of reports published by the news media that may
have risked the operational security of our mission during ...
Never

1. Mobilization Phase
2. Deployment Phase
3. Mission Phase

1
1
1

Please go to next page.

Infrequently

2
2
2

Some Frequently

3
3
3

4
4
4

Very Frequently

5
5
5
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2. News media personnel were cooperative and easy to work with during...
4. Mobilization phase
5. Deployment Phase
6. Mission Phase

Never

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

Very Frequently

5
5
5

3.1 know of news media personnel who deceptively gained access to unauthorized information or
locations during...
Never

Infrequently

1

7. Mobilization phase
8. Deployment Phase
9. Mission Phase

2
2
2

1

1

Some

3
3
3

Frequently

Very Frequently

5
5
5

4
4
4

4. News media reports were impartial during...
Never

10. Mobilization phase
11. Deployment Phase
12. Mission Phase

Infrequently

2
2
2

1
1
1

Some

3
3
3

Frequently

Very Frequently

4
4
4

5
5
5

5. The information in news media reports about my unit’s operations were correct during...
13. Mobilization phase
14. Deployment Phase
15. Mission Phase

Never

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

Very Frequently

5
5
5

6. When asked questions by news media personnel, I was able to provide answers quickly enough to
satisfy the needs of media people, including their deadlines during...

16. Mobilization phase
17. Deployment Phase
18. Mission Phase

Never

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

Very Frequently

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

7. When answering news media personnel questions about my unit s operations, I always provided
correct information during...
Some Frequently Very Frequently
Infrequently
Never
5
4
3
2
1
19. Mobilization phase
5
4
3
2
1
20. Deployment Phase
5
4
3
2
1
21. Mission Phase

Please go to next page
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8. I know of an instance ( or instances) that news media personnel reported information they had previ
ously said would be off the record during...

22. Mobilization phase
23. Deployment Phase
24. Mission Phase

Never

1
1
1

Infrequently

2
2
2

Some

Frequently

4
4
4

3
3

3

Very Frequently

5
5
5

9. Did news media personnel ask questions that could not be answered without risking your unit’s
operational security during...
Never

25. Mobilization phase
26. Deployment Phase
27. Mission Phase

1
1
1

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

Very Frequently

5
5
5

10. I welcomed members of the news media into my unit area during...
Never

28. Mobilization phase
29. Deployment Phase
30. Mission Phase

1
1
1

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

Very Frequently

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

11. When media personnel requested access to my unit’s area to interview soldiers, it was granted
during...
Infrequently Some Frequently Very Frequently
Never
5
2
3
4
1
31. Mobilization phase
3
4
5
1
2
32. Deployment Phase
4
5
3
2
1
33. Mission Phase
12. My soldiers were provided with media reference cards to deal with news media personnel during...
Never

34. Mobilization phase
35. Deployment Phase
36. Mission Phase

1
1
1

Infrequendy

Some

Frequently

Very Frequently

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

13. Do you think that the presence of media personnel in your unit was a threat to operational security
during...
Some Frequently Very Frequently
Infrequently
Never
5
4
3
2
1
37. Mobilization phase
5
4
3
2
1
38. Deployment Phase
5
4
3
2
1
39. Mission Phase
14. News media personnel displayed a real concern for the well being of soldiers in my unit during...
Never

40. Mobilization phase
41. Deployment Phase
42. Mission Phase

1
1
1

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

Very Frequently

2
2
2

3

4
4
4

5
5
5

Please go to next page.

3
3
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15. News media personnel interfered with training seeking interviews with soldiers during...
Never

43. Mobilization Phase
44. Deployment Phase
45. Mission Phase

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

2
2
2

3
3

4
4
4

1
1
1

3

Very Frequently

5
5
5

16. News media personnel interfered with important meetings seeking interviews with soldiers during...
Never

46. Mobilization Phase
47. Deployment Phase
48. Mission Phase

Infrequently

Some

Frequently

2
2
2

3
3

4
4
4

1
1
1

3

Very Frequently

5
5
5

Directions: Please use the following agreement scale to answer questions 17-21 below.
Strongly
agree

(1)

agree

neither agree
nor disagree

disagree

Strongly
Disagree

(3)

(4)

(5)

(2)

17. News media reporters seemed to have adequate
knowledge about military operations to know what
they were reporting during...

SA

A

1
1
1

49. Mobilization Phase
50. Deployment Phase
51. Mission Phase

5
5
5

4
4
4

3

2
2
2

SD

D

N

3

3

18. News media personnel seemed to understand the
military’s need for operational security during...

52. Mobilization Phase
53. Deployment Phase
54. Mission Phase

19. Overall, news media coverage did not risk my
unit’s operational security during OPERATION
JOINT ENDEAVOR.
20. The media’s mission is just as important to
society as the military’s mission.
^1. The military-media relationship has improved
since the Gulf War.

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3

4
4
4

1

2

3

4

3

5
5
5

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Please go the next page.
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Background Information
The following questions are confidential and will be used for group statistics and comparative purposes
only.
22. What is your rank?
(58) CPT MAJ LTC

COL

other (Please specify.

23. What is your job title?
(59)
"?) Co. Cdr
BN Cdr Bde Cdr

What is your branch?
AR FA
EN
IN

QM

.)

other (Please specify here.

other (Please specify here

.)

.)

What is your gender?
Male
Female
27.
Did you command a unit while in Bosnia? Please circle yes/no.
(62)
If yes, how many months were you in command during the period from mobilization until
now?.
Please indicate the following military operations you have participated in:

Desert Shield
job title.
Desert Storm
job title.
Haiti
Job title
Not applicable
29. What is your age?
30. What are the main concerns you have about how the media affect your unit’s operational
security?

STOP
Please return this survey to Major Suttle, the 1st Armored Division Public Affairs Officer.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND SUPPORT
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APPENDIX D
Survey Population

pi

IDate: Wed, 15 May 1996 11:53:00 -0700 (PDT)
IFrom: TFE PAO MAJ Suttle <paooic@TFMAIN.1AD.ARMY.MIL>
"To: angion2 <angion2©MARSHALL.EDU>
Subject: RE: Research Survey
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EHere is who we came with.
Most are still here.
I think only a couple of
^battalion commanders have changed out.
It will be no problem to get a
iforwarding address on them. ”
You won't have to rely on the good graces of
tthe little old ladies at each branch to provide addresses like I did..
I
Ihope this helps.
Suttle
^★★★***********************1'*********-k**-k**'k’k*-k*'k-k'k*1r1c‘k-ic-k*-ir-i'-itlci'*-k’k1c*-k-k1f-k*-i'’k'k*

vk'k'k-k-k’k'k’k-kic'k'k'k'k’k’k-k-k’k-k’k'k'k-k’ir'kic'k'k-k'k’k'k’k’k-k’k'k'k’k-k-k-k

(COMMAND GROUP
(Commanding General
MG William L. Nash
ZADC-M
BG Stanley F. Cherrie
ZADC-S
BG James P. O+Neal
(Chief of Staff COL John M. Brown III

SGS MAJ Hoyt E. Roberson
IDCSM CSM Jack L. Tilley
ZAide-de-Camp
CPT Vernie Reichling
IHQ Cmdt
MAJ Joseph F. Clegg
(CG+s Secretary Ms. Bertha Ramirez
(C/S Secretary Ms. Diane van Dunk
EProtocol Officer
Ms. Michele Johnson
EPRIMARY STAFF
(3-1 LTC Steve M. Poet
C3-2 LTC Melissa Patrick
(3-3 LTC Edward M. Kane
(3-4
LTC Gary R. Addison
MAJ
Scott Dick
(3-5
(3-6 LTC Randolph R. Strong
SPECIAL STAFF
IRMO LTC Davis S. Welch
LTC Samuel J. Hernandez
EPMO
Christopher Maher
SJA LTC
IDIV SURGEON
LTC William S. Besser
LTC Thomas E. York
HG
IDIV CHEMO LTC Robert J. Launstein
CHAPLAIN CHAP (LTC) Scott McCrystal
ALO AF LTC Richard L. Jones
EPAO MAJ John E. Suttle
HST BDE
3-5 CAV
2-67 AR
44-67 AR

CDR
CDR
CDR
CDR

COL
LTC
LTC
LTC

2ND BDE
3-12 In
44-12 IN
2-68 AR

CDR
CDR
CDR
CDR

COL John R.S. Batiste
LTC Gene C. Kamena
LTC William F. Briscoe
LTC Oscar R. Anderson

Gregory Fontenot
Anthony A. CucoloIII
Michael Jones
Walter N. Anderson

44TH BDE(AVN) CDR
COL William L. Webb III
2- 227 AVN CDR LTC Allen D. Swain
3- 227 AVN CDR LTC Thomas R. Burnett

1^

i3
= i3

7-227 AVN CDR
1-1 CAV CDR

LTC Robert E. Cox, Jr.
LTC Gregory A. Stone

DISCOM CDR
47 FSB CDR
123 MSB CDR
127 ASB CDR
501 FSB CDR

COL
LTC
LTC
LTC
LTC

iDIVENG CDR
23 ENG BN CDR
•4 0 ENG BN CDR

COL Steven R.
LTC Todd T. Semonite
LTC William J. Seymour

1DIVARTY CDR
2-3 FA CDR
‘4-2 9 FA CDR
zA-94 FA CDR
CC-3 33 FA CDR

COL
LTC
LTC
CPT
CPT

Alan W. Thrasher
Peter S. Corpac
Jeffery W. Hammond

^SEPARATES
5-3 ADA CDR
ZL41 SIG BN CDR
501 MI BN CDR
501 MP CO CDR
IHHC 1AD CDR

LTC
LTC
LTC
CPT
CPT

David R. Wolf
Randolph R. Strong
Kevin D. Johnson
Christopher R. Gosselin
William D. Hibner

70

James H.
Paul W. c
William V
Thomas
Anthony V

3+6 -

John W. Hallam

W CORPS UNITS
IL6th Corps Spt. Grp.
205th Military
Intelligence Bde.
I8th MP Bde.
30th Medical Bde.
22nd Sig. Bde.

Col. Bennie E. Williams
Col.
Col.
Col.
Col.

Charles J. Green
Steven J. Curry
Thomas I. Clements
James D. Culbert

INTERNATIONAL UNIT COMMANDERS
RUSSIAN BDE
Commander

Col. Alexandr Lentsov

NTORDBRIG
Commander
Brig. Gen. Finn Saermark-Thomsen (Den)
Deputy Commander
Brigadier Jan Bergstrom (Swe)
Deputy Commander
Col Wtodzimierz Sasiadek (Pol)
Chief of Staff
Col Kjell Grandhagen (Nor)

TURKISH BDEurkish Bn.
Commander
Col. Ahmet Berberoglu

F'rom: angion2
To: paooic
Subject: Research Survey
Date: Monday, May 13, 1996 2:50PM
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